Since 1979, China has experienced a widespread revival of religious faith and practice. This article aims to provide an overview of this phenomenon, by examining the causes behind it, the variety and popularity of religions and the different profi les of believers. It suggests that China's religions are diverse, encompassing offi cial, unoffi cial, and folk religions, and that the revival is signifi cant and visible. According to offi cial statistics, the fi ve largest religions in 2003 counted 144 million believers, while the non-offi cial sources give the fi gure as nearer 200 million. The revival has been fuelled by a number of factors: the state's lifting of the ban to freedom of worship; popular disillusion with the offi cial ideology; economic and social uncertainties in the wake of economic reforms and modernization; and the enduring resilience of religion and tradition. For ethnic minorities like Uighurs and Tibetans, the revival of their religion has been accompanied by a similar cultural renaissance. Buddhists and Daoists among the Han in Hubei Province come from a wide range of educational backgrounds and professions, although the majority of them are women or were born before 1956. The Han Buddhists and Daoists turn to religion primarily for practical reasons, that is, to gain some advantage in their earthly lives rather than looking for rewards in the afterlife. For this reason, religious fundamentalism may have limited appeal to the Han Chinese.
Introduction
The Chinese Han, especially Buddhists and Daoists, turn to religion primarily for utilitarian reasons, that is, to seek benefi ts in their earthly life, rather than looking for rewards in an afterlife.
This article will review religions that attract the largest numbers of followers but which have drawn far less attention in the West.
1 They include Mahayana Buddhism and a variety of folk religions. It will also survey Tibetan Buddhism, underground Catholicism and Protestantism, and Falun Gong, which has recently come under the spotlight in the US and European media, in Western policy-making, and even academic circles. As far as Tibetans and Uighurs are concerned, religion has remained an inherent part of their culture and life, and the state's relaxed policies have helped to aid the revival of religion as well as their cultural heritage.
Different Religions in China
This article adopts the following defi nition of religion:
Religion is a set of beliefs, symbols and practices based on the notion of supernatural forces and in some cases, an afterlife, and which unites believers in a socio-religious community.
2 This broad defi nition incorporates folk religions that are peculiar to China, plus the fi ve main religions.
3 Following recent studies on China's religions, 4 this article leaves out Confucianism from the discussion, largely because in present-day China it exists primarily in the form of ethical teachings, rather than religion per se. Rarely is Confucius worshipped in China today, nor is Confucianism viewed as a religion.
As Liu and Leung persuasively demonstrate, the growth and revival of the Catholic Church in China is deeply shaped by its relationship with the state as well as its indigenization (Liu and Leung 2002: 121-38) . Furthermore, political constraints on religious activities persist despite relaxed governmental policies.
In a similar vein, Myron L. Cohen categorized Chinese religions into three categories, namely: offi cial, heterodoxy, and popular. Following Cohen's methodology, for the purposes of this article and to facilitate the discussion (as Table 1 indicates), three types of religion in China will be discussed (Cohen 1992: 17-31 A signifi cant number of believers prefer to attend the unoffi cial underground churches, which they see as independent from any government interference.
• Booming alongside these underground churches are unoffi cial sects. Their doctrines resemble the fi ve main religions, yet their teachings and practices may differ from those of the big fi ve. Some choose to maintain a low profi le in order not to invite a government crackdown. Others, such as Falun Gong, choose instead to confront the state and assert publicly their organizational independence.
• Lastly, a number of Tibetan Buddhists and Xinjiang Muslims ignore or challenge the state's control and support independence of their regions.
Indigenous religions, or folk religions. Folk religions come in var-
ied and diffused forms, including utilitarian ancestor or lineage worship (worshipping one's ancestors so that the ancestor's soul can intervene on behalf of its living descendants), local god worship, divination, geomancy (most notably fengshui), witchcraft (sorcery, exorcism and planchette writing), physiognomy, and certain taboos.
5
Many of the folk religions tend to vary across regions, and their followers generally believe in several at any one time.
There have been a limited number of studies on religions in postMao China, but the number is growing. Most of these studies focus on Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam and folk religions in China. A few studies also survey offi cial policies and religious practices in China. These studies enrich our understanding of the state's regulations, its operation of religious institutions, and the views and practice of religious professionals. As many of these studies are anthropologically oriented and based on fi eldwork, they reveal much of the interaction on the one hand between these institutions and their followers and, on the other, between religion and the local political structure.
Nevertheless, these studies have noticeable limitations. First, few of them provide sound data on the popularity of all the fi ve religions as well as folk religions. While there is some analysis of the number of followers of Islam, Protestantism and Catholics, yet discussion on the number of followers of Daoism and the most popular Buddhism and folk religions is scant. Furthermore, many studies fail to take account of changes in the number of places of worship over the past two decades and the main religions among the different ethnic groups in China. Second, there is a lack of systemic analyses backed by data on why the Chinese have turned to religion in the post-Mao era. Third, we have yet to know who exactly the religious Chinese are and what sort of profi le they have. We thus remain unsure about why the Chinese embrace religion and who the religious followers are. 4HIS ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO lLL IN THESE GAPS IN OUR UNDERSTANDING BY  UTILIZING OFlCIAL AND NONOFlCIAL DATA ON THE NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS OF  THE VARIOUS RELIGIONS THE PLACES OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP THE PROlLE OF  BELIEVERS AND PUBLISHED SURVEY DATA ON THE VARIOUS REASONS THEY TURN  TO RELIGION )T ALSO UNDERSCORES THE UTILITARIAN MOTIVATION FOR RELIGIOUS  PRACTICE AMONG THE (AN #HINESE WHICH Table 2 ). These numbers should be treated with caution though for the following reasons. First, it is diffi cult to distinguish actual practitioners from self-proclaimed believers. Second, even though the state permits religious activities, it refuses to endorse them, and even openly promotes atheism. Therefore, many religious activities take place covertly, so it becomes problematic to estimate the numbers of followers of unoffi cial religions and sects. The offi cial statistic of 144 million followers in 2003 for the fi ve religions can only give us a very rough guide to the current status of religion in the country.
The case of Hubei Province sheds light on the popularity of religion over the past few decades. Information on the province has been published jointly by a Professor of Theology at the leading provincial university and a Deputy Secretary General of the provincial legislature, who had ready access to both religious survey data and internal gov-Hongyi Harry Lai ernmental data. Since Hubei is at a medium level of socio-economic development among the 31 provinces in China, it can be regarded as an average Chinese province. In the early 1980s religion was still on the wane as a result of devastation caused by the Cultural Revolution of 1966.
8 After the late 1980s, religious groups expanded, as refl ected in the rise of Buddhist and Daoist followers in Hubei (see Table 3 ), and this was matched by a similar trend nationwide. The numbers of places of religious worship nationwide for all the fi ve mainstream religions, especially Daoism, Buddhism (among the Hans), Protestantism and Catholicism rose rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 4 ). By the late 1990s, the number of religious centres and churches established by the fi ve main religions nationwide rivalled the period immediately after the Chinese Communists came to power. Religious places of worship include churches, monasteries, mosques and make-shift meeting places. They totalled over 100,000 in 2003. In addition, the number of clerics of the fi ve religions also expanded, reaching 300,000 in 2003 (see Table 5 ).
In Table 5 , Buddhist and Daoist meeting places are fewer than those of other religions for two reasons. First, the number of Buddhist and Daoist temples may be under-estimated. In Hubei in the 1990s, for example, only 476 Buddhist and 206 Daoist temples were registered, whereas 2,067 Buddhist and Daoist temples were not. Second, one Buddhist or Daoist temple can serve many more followers than one site of other religions.
In the post-Mao period, the state revived the offi cial associations of the fi ve religions, which were set up in the 1950s and then abolished during the Cultural Revolution. Offi cial associations play a dual role in mediating the relations between the state and religion. On the one hand, they help the state to implement offi cial religious policies and manage local religious organizations, for example, by setting the number of Buddhist temples to be opened and by preventing religious groups and believers from stepping outside the offi cial lines. In this sense, the associations serve as the enforcers of state rules (MacInnis 1989: 147) . On the other hand, they voice the concerns (like local offi cials' infringement on religious freedom) to governmental agencies and top leaders for their religious groups and the believers. Offi cial religious associations also endeavour to promote the religion they represent. For example, by 1999 the offi cial Protestant association had printed 25 million copies of bibles and 10 million copies of hymnals, set up 18 seminaries, trained 3,800 graduates and were publishing 100,000 copies of Tianfeng (a monthly journal), (Liaowang [Outlook] , 1999 (21): 23-27).
Unoffi cial Religions

Underground Catholic Church
The centralized Chinese state has had a long history of confl ict with the Catholic Church. An early example is the rites controversy between 1640 and 1742. The controversy resulted, on the one hand, in the Pope's edict that Catholic missionaries should forbid the practice of Chinese rites and, on the other hand, the Qing Emperor's expulsion of the Jesuits from China, which lasted for about 100 years. Antagonism between the Vatican and the Chinese Communists erupted during the Chinese civil war, resulting in the uneasy development of Catholicism in China in the following decades. In the 1950s, the CCP encouraged a Three-self Movement in order to sever the Catholic Church's ties with the Vatican. It arrested pro-Vatican bishops, priests and nuns, and drove pro-Vatican Catholics underground. The Vatican, in return, has been rejecting archbishop and bishop appointments by the Chinese offi cial church and has offi cially recognized Taiwan instead of the People's Republic.
The underground church consecrates new bishops, ordains priests, organizes national episcopal conferences and secures the Vatican's authorization. Some elements of the underground church may be more confrontational toward the state than Rome would expect them to be (Hunter and Chan 1993: 241; Gong and Zhou 1999: 73) . An estimate placed the number of offi cial bishops in 1995 at 70, and that of the underground bishops at 60 (Mainland China Commission, 1996: 89) . The underground Catholic Church appears to have attracted more followers than the offi cial church by the early 1990s. The underground church exists mainly in the rural area of Hebei, Shaanxi, Guangxi, Gansu and Xinjiang. It was estimated that in the early 1990s only one-fi fth or less of the total number of Catholics attended the offi cial church, and that in some provinces the underground church attracted twice as many followers as the offi cial one. However, the offi cial church has managed to reverse this trend in recent years. Many underground Catholics now also attend the offi cial church (Hunter and Chan 1989: 236-41; Chan 1994: 19,13-14; Mainland China Commission 1996: 82-89; Liu and Leung 2002: 126; personal 
Independent Protestant Church
During the Cultural Revolution, some Christians kept their faith by attending the secret 'house churches'. Like the underground Catholic Church, the independent church operates without the state's authorization, sometimes even overtly. The independent church exists for three reasons. First, some Protestants regard the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) -the offi cial Protestant church -as having compromised too much vis-à-vis the atheist state, and therefore they refuse to acknowledge it. Second, believers persecuted by the state during the late-Mao era are reluctant to join the state-sanctioned church. Many Christians still widely despise the TSPM's cooperation with the high-handed state in the 1950s at denunciation meetings and thought reforms. Third, the sparse geographical distribution of the buildings of the offi cial church (partly due to the government's cap on new church buildings) also encourages the congregation to assemble at a nearby building of the independent church. Retired and devout believers who want to pray more often fi nd house churches suit their needs best. The state restricts and occasionally cracks down on these two underground churches (Hunter and Chan 1993: 81-88; Chan 1995; Mainland China Commission 1996: 89) .
Unoffi cial Sects
Unoffi cial sects differ in their preaching and practice from the fi ve offi cial religions, and they also try to avoid the state's control. These sects have multiplied in post-Mao China. In Hunan Province alone, nearly 10,000 of these sects were eradicated in the course of fi ve government campaigns in the 1990s. These included unoffi cial Christian sects, such as Lingling Jiao [Oriental Lightning], Zhushen Jiao [Religion of the Main God], as well as unoffi cial Buddhist, Daoist, and folk-religious sects, such as Buddhist-like Falun Gong, Guanyi Famen, Daoist Yiguan Dao, and probably qigong-based Zhong Gong (claiming 38 million followers at its peak, with an extensive business network and under the leadership of Zhang Hongbao).
The state has viewed these sects with suspicion and has at times cracked down on them. For example, Falun Gong and Zhong Gong have been banned, and their founders placed on the government's wanted lists. The state is wary of the organizational independence and secrecy of these unoffi cial sects, their apocalyptical appeals, the challenges they pose to the Party, as well as their foreign ties. Reportedly, the unoffi cial sects the state has suppressed share most of the following characteristics:
• secretive activities and elaborate organizations;
• personality cult of the sect leader;
• preaching about doomsday;
• tight control of their members;
• mysticism and claimed supernatural abilities of the sect;
• independence of the CCP, or even hostility toward it;
• condemnation of offi cial religious associations and the offi cial church (such as the TSPM); and • links with the West, Taiwan, South Korea, and other overseas places (Cao 1999: 29-30; Tan and Kong 2000: 28-30) .
Falun Gong as an Unoffi cial Sect
As an unoffi cial sect attracting the international limelight in recent years, Falun Gong deserves a brief discussion here. Falun Gong is based on an unoffi cial and exclusive theology and boasts an extensive organizational network. Founded by Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong fuses Daoist meditation and Buddhist doctrines. Li preaches about an apocalypse (mo jie), 9 encourages mystic and inward-directed development of the self, and attracts followers by claiming his and his followers' 'supernatural' abilities. Li preaches truthfulness, benevolence and forbearance as the core principles of Falun Gong, and promotes personal cultivation of virtues and supernatural abilities through meditation and practice. He condemns the corrupting infl uence of the capitalist system, claims to know about a higher truth, and demands a high standard of morality (Shue 2001) . Falun Gong practice provided millions of anxious, insecure, and ill followers with spiritual peace and medical relief (Li 1994; Liu 1999; Liu 2000: 103-34; Wong 1999) . Falun Gong's large nationwide organization operated at four levels, namely, national, provincial, local, and grassroots levels. At the top level was its headquarters, established in Beijing in 1992. At the grassroots level were 28,000 sites where it was practised. As the overall leader, Li was able to quickly issue instructions through telecommunications (including e-mails) to each level. Many national, provincial and local cadres and offi cials became followers, and even supplied inside information regarding the government's policies toward the sect.
Under close scrutiny, Falun Gong may have propagated itself through means that contradict its own axioms. Li reportedly altered his birthday to that of Buddha in order to claim himself as the new saviour. He also proclaims that he and his master set the lifespan for the earth and that he could postpone an imminent explosion of the earth. Li claims to have supernatural abilities, even though his mother, neighbours, colleagues, and even he himself privately deny their existence. Li has accumulated a large amount of wealth yet has evaded income tax (Hua and Zhong 1999: 132, 99-101, 148-56) .
Li and his followers staged a dozen mass protests in front of government offi ces, newspaper offi ces, and TV stations to challenge criticisms by the local media, scientists and sceptics (Wong 1999: 8, 11) . Since 1999, the confl ict between Falun Gong and the state has intensifi ed. In April 1999, over 10,000 Falun Gong followers caught the state off-guard by staging a peaceful protest and surrounding Zhongnanhai in Beijing, the Chinese White House. This event demonstrated to the state Falun Gong's extensive mobilizational capacity. Chinese leaders were well aware of large-scale rebellions led by religious sects or followers in China in recent centuries. Between the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, the Qing empire was rocked by large rebellions led by the White Lotus Sect and the Heavenly Principles Sect. In the mid-nineteenth century the Taiping Rebellion destabilized the Qing Dynasty. Hong Xiuquan, the leading rebel, was a proclaimed Christian follower who claimed to have received a message from God. Chinese leaders, especially the top leader Jiang Zemin, soon learned and worried about Falun Gong's infi ltration into the Party and government, its large following, and its potential to rally the support of millions of discontented people into nationwide mass protests.
10 In July 1999, the state declared Falun Gong an evil cult and outlawed it; key organizers were arrested soon afterwards.
Since then, Falun Gong followers have been engaged in a war of attrition with the state, yet have seen their infl uence waning. Occasionally small groups of Falun Gong followers protest in and outside mainland China, including staging publicly disruptive acts. Most of these protesters in mainland China have been quickly arrested. By August 2000, at least 151 Falun Gong followers had been convicted of leaking state secrets, creating chaos, or other crimes (Human Rights Watch 2001). In early 2001, several Falun Gong followers, in response to Li's call for action, set themselves on fi re in protests at Tiananmen Square. The offi cial media quickly used the footage of these acts as sensational material to portray Falun Gong as a suicidal and evil cult to the general public. Since then, Falun Gong has staged several acts in public defi ance of the state. During May and June 2001, Falun Gong followers used timed radio devices to broadcast publicly in ten provinces Li Hongzhi's preaching and his organization's precepts. These followers were soon arrested. In 14 July, Falun Gong followers who had been imprisoned in Harbin attempted to commit suicide, and the authority rescued all but three. The state blamed overseas followers for instigating the event. After the 11 September attacks in the US, Communist Party leaders even accused some Falun Gong followers of committing terrorist acts (South China Morning Post, 14 December, 2001 
Religious Revival and Movements in Tibet and Xinjiang
Religion has been an intrinsic part of the culture and tradition of a number of ethnic minorities. The largest and most visible ethnic groups comprise Tibetans and Uighurs. Tibetan Buddhism has pervaded Tibetan daily life for centuries and many Tibetans see the Dalai Lama, their supreme religious leader, as their spiritual leader. Uighurs in Xinjiang accepted Islam as their faith hundreds of years ago and Imams wield signifi cant infl uence on their lives. Religion is also an underlying factor in the movements of independence of Tibet and Xinjiang from China's rule.
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The Cultural Revolution devastated Buddhism in Tibet, as in other provinces in China. With relaxed control in the post-Mao period, Tibetans revived their religious beliefs and traditions. As Beijing's liberal leaders, such as Hu Yaobang, relaxed control in the 1980s, Tibetans demanded greater autonomy, for example, by claiming Tibetan as their offi cial language. Their drive toward greater social freedom posed a direct challenge to the authority of the Party and Beijing. Unemployed urban Tibetans were unhappy with competition from Han people in Tibet; while monks and nuns, along with conservatives and traditionalists, despised secular developments in the wake of reform. Some radical Tibetans played down the central government's generous subsidies and blamed the backwardness of Tibet solely on the Communist rule; these groups supported the independence of Tibet. In addition, exiled Tibetans tried to exert their political infl uence in Tibet in various ways, including disseminating their political views during visits to Tibet, which tended to attract Beijing's suspicion. In the 1980s, many Tibetan intellectuals and offi cials objected to radical movements that would derail gradualist reform and liberalization in Tibet. Nevertheless, other elites tolerated radicals in order to enhance their position vis-à-vis the central government and to obtain more subsidies (Shakya 1999: 419-21; Xu 1999: 147-61) .
The pro-independence movement grew and took to the streets in the October 1987 , March 1988 , March 1989 and May 1993 In the fi rst three protests, the police opened fi re on the Tibetan protesters, who were shouting slogans for Tibetan independence and throwing rocks at the police, resulting in six to sixteen deaths in each incident (Xu 1999: 147-61) .
In Xinjiang, Muslims total over 10 million, which is equivalent to 60 percent of the population and 95 percent of the religious followers in the province. Muslims worship at most of the 24,000 mosques in Xinjiang. Pan-Islam gained initial support in Xinjiang in the 1930s, and seems to have undergone something of a revival with the rise of post-Soviet Central Asian countries, the support from several Middle Eastern Muslim countries, and recently, the NATO intervention in Kosovo. To supporters of full autonomy and even independence for Xinjiang, Beijing's policy of promoting economic development is merely a facade to erode the Uygur culture and Muslim beliefs. Resentment over competition from the Hans also provided the potential for schism among the ethnic minorities (Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 2000: 25; Ming Bao, 2 September 1999; South China Morning Post, 28 August 2000; Mackerras 1994: 194-96; Becquelin 2000: 65-90) . Uighurs are also unhappy with Beijing's restriction of their religious activities as well as their lack of political power. Former Mujaheddin fi ghters in Afghanistan might have aided militancy in Xinjiang (Lufti 2002: 204-05) .
Many independence advocates in Xinjiang operate under the banner of Islam. Working as religious clerics, they condemn the CCP and the government, interpret the Koran as advocating an Islamic state and militant jihad, and propose independence as the best way to preserve local cultures. Chinese offi cial sources suggest that explosions, assassinations, and other violent acts in the 1990s totalled a few thousand, and that in 1998 alone, over 70 serious incidents occurred, resulting in more than 380 deaths (Becquelin 2000: 87) . Southern Xinjiang (such as Kashi), where the population is overwhelmingly non-Han and Muslim and where unemployment and economic underdevelopment are severe, as well as Yining, the former capital of East Turkestan, may be hotbeds of the separatist movement (Becquelin 2000: 65-90; Ming Bao, 3 November 2001) .
The state has suppressed religious separatism in Tibet and especially Xinjiang. Since the 11 September attacks in the US, Beijing has stressed that violent Muslim radicals constitute a terrorist threat in China and has stepped up its crackdown.
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Folk Religions
Scholars have long documented Chinese folk religions.
13 Folk religions quickly regained their popularity in the countryside in the 1980s, as suggested by anecdotal evidence. As early as 1982, peasants in Chuansha County in suburban Shanghai fl ocked to visit fortune-tellers at a fee, and were willing to pay a sorceress large sums of money for cures to their diseases. In 1986 in a market town in Guangdong Province, a total of 393 ancestor halls were erected. Locals there regularly worshipped the spirits of ancestors in order to bring good luck to their living descendants. In 1988, in a village in Sichuan, ancestor worship took place during the holidays, and religious rites were performed at funerals (MacInnis 1989: 387-89, 368, 373, 395, 394) . 14 A survey (summarized in Table 6 ) provides circumstantial evidence for the extent of the popularity of folk religions. Of all the respondents, more than 41 percent believed totally or partially in some form of superstition, and more than 38 percent had at one time participated in such rituals; 19 percent had done both. Folk religions have become very popular in rural areas where most Chinese live, resulting in a marked rise in the number of new temples being built and a boom in sales of manuals and books on folk religions. As followers of folk religions may account for 19 percent of the population, as noted above, and as many of these followers may also belong to one of the 'big fi ve' religions, one may assume that one-fi fth of all the Chinese in the mainland accept some form of religious faith.
Profi le of Religious Followers
In 1997, the People's Political Consultative Conference of Hubei Province conducted a survey on 1,160 Buddhists and Daoists in 26 townships within 12 cities, counties and municipal districts. This appears to constitute the only published data on the background of religious followers in China. Given Hubei's medium level of socio-economic development in China, it can be regarded as a representative Chinese province. In addition, as the above-mentioned statistics on religious followers suggest, Buddhists and Daoists constitute the majority of believers of the fi ve major religions in China, especially among the Han. The same is true for Chinese societies in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Therefore, these data can be illuminating. Data on Buddhists and Daoists in Hubei in 1997 (see Figure 2) suggest the following profi le:
1. The majority (65.3 percent) were born before 1957 and grew up (or were growing up) before the CCP's prohibition of religions of 1966-78. Those who were born between 1957 and 1967 accounted for 14 percent, those between 1967 and 1979 for 19 percent, and those after 1979 for merely 2.2 percent. 2. The educational background of believers was diverse. Among the Buddhists and Daoists, 29 percent were college graduates, 20 percent left after high-school, 29 percent left after primary school, while 22 percent were illiterate. 3. Females (63 percent) accounted for the majority of the believers. 4. Believers were more or less representative of professions among the population, with peasants and workers making up 60 percent of the believers, and other professions 29 percent. Even though many cadres and teachers were Party members, and even though the Party prohibited its members from believing in religion, cadres and teachers still made up 11 percent of the believers (Gong and Zhou 1999: 71). Deng's Southern Tour in 1992. Rampant corruption has further undermined the offi cial ideology, with an increasing number of people turning to religion for an alternative set of beliefs to fi ll the spiritual vacuum.
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#AUSES OF 2ELIGIOUS 2EVIVAL
#HINESE OFlCIALS AND BOTH LOCAL AND OVERSEAS SCHOLARS HAVE PROPOSED SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS REVIVAL IN PRESENT DAY #HINA (UNTER AND #HAN -AC)NNIS ,UO /NE INDISPUTABLE CAUSE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL IN #HINA IS THE STATEgS LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS ON OPEN RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES ESPECIALLY THOSE THAT DO NOT CHALLENGE THE STATE DIRECTLY -AC)NNIS (UNTER AND #HAN -AOgS HEAVYHANDED REPRESSION WIPED OUT MOST RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES DRIVING THE RESIDUAL UNDERGROUND -AOIST POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION EITHER SCARED MANY OF THE BELIEVERS AWAY FROM RELIGIOUS PRACTICES ENTIRELY OR EVEN CONVERTED THEM INTO NONBELIEVERS )N THE POST-AO ERA THE STATE HAS OPENLY ACKNOWL EDGED ITS EXTREME PRACTICE UNDER LEFTIST LEADERSHIP AND HAS TOLERATED RELIGIOUS PRACTICE THAT DOES NOT POSE
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Third, religion meets the population's needs for psychological comfort and spiritual fulfi lment, especially in confronting a variety of problems inherent in the modernization program, including increasing marketization, rapid social transition, and emerging social problems. A large body of literature on modernization suggests that this process could transform and disrupt the existing class structure, ethnic and tribal relations, political power structure, and even the values system. Modernization in several Western countries and many non-Western countries was accompanied by social disruption, political upheavals, protest, revolution, and even large-scale wars. These examples included the civil wars in Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and China as well as numerous coups and armed movements in Africa and Latin America. Modernization also gives rise to deviant social behaviour and leads to the breakdown of traditional values and ethics.
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In a similar vein, recent economic and social changes in China since the late 1970s have created considerable social stresses and ruptures. Millions are dislocated socially and economically; many have been laid off and hence are experiencing a loss of social safety and security (including free health-care and guaranteed income); rural income grows sluggishly; and rural workers face discrimination in the cities. Alienation in the form of loneliness and helplessness in an increasingly competitive world, together with the prevalent social anomie, as evidence in money-worship, prostitution, and the breakup of families and family values, are taking their toll on the people. Religion, on the other hand, provides spiritual peace to a population troubled and disillusioned with present-day social and political turmoil. This is just as signifi cant as the lessening of state prohibition in explaining the religious revival.
Fourth, religious infl uence survived even the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution the infl uence of religion abated yet persisted, especially in the countryside. Religions, such as Buddhism, exercise their subtle infl uence on people through literature, art, philosophy and family (MacInnis 1989: 155-63; Hunter and Chan 1993: 168-75) . These residues of religious beliefs can be rekindled once conditions are favourable.
Fifth, not only the Chinese cultural traditions but also the state shape the revival of religions. On the one hand, religious revival refl ects the resilience of the traditional culture. Many Chinese Catholics maintained their faith during the Cultural Revolution because the Church upheld their bonds to kin and ancestors, which is an important traditional Chinese value. On the other hand, as a result of the state's past efforts to eliminate religion, some popular religious rituals today are modifi ed traditional elements that differed from those before the Communist reign, or are merely cultural fragments (Madsen 1989; Siu 1989) .
Han Buddhist and Daoist Utilitarian Belief
The studies on China's religious revival cited above also touch on factors that motivate individual Chinese to turn to religion. However, they are not based on any comprehensive survey. In this article, I proceed via a different approach, by examining the results of the aforementioned survey on Buddhists and Daoists in Hubei (see Table 7 ) and drawing conclusions. Respondents were allowed to choose multiple causes for turning to religions.
From the survey, we can see a utilitarian tendency in the Han Chinese religious belief. The largest portion (51.6 percent) of believers turned to religion out of a hope that the divine would bring them material benefi ts. Specifi cally, 36 percent sought prosperity, 9.4 percent wanted material well-being, 6.2 percent hoped to obtain medical cure or relief through their religious beliefs. That is to say, the Han Buddhists and Daoists accept religion hoping that supernatural forces would bring them material benefi ts in their mortal lives (Hou and Fan 1994: 9-10, 86-129; Gao 1994: 332; Xu Shaoqiang, cf. Hunter and Chan 1993: 174) . Only 30 percent of the believers sought spiritual guidance from religion, 9.8 percent reported an intellectual fascination with religion, and about one-fi fth turned to religion out of their political and social discontent. A number of the respondents accepted religion because of family infl uence.
As discussed, recent political, economic, and social changes in China, such as unemployment, losses of social security and medical care, corruption, money-worship, prostitution, and the breakup of families, may have contributed to religious conversion. Surprisingly, only 1.5 percent of the respondents reported a loss of confi dence in the CCP and socialism, probably out of the political sensitivity of the choice. Nevertheless, religious conversion signals the offi cial ideology's declining appeal.
Conclusion
In China today three categories of religion exist: (i) offi cial religions, namely, Buddhism, Daoism (Taoism), Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism, represented by offi cial associations and approved monasteries; (ii) unoffi cial religions that operate without the state's permission, including underground Catholic and Protestant churches, unoffi cial sects (such as Falun Gong), and pro-independence Tibetan Buddhists and Xinjiang Muslims; (iii) folk religions of various forms, whose practitioners are usually not well organized. All the above three categories of religion expanded rapidly in the post-Mao period.
Religious revival in China is driven by the state's abandonment of Mao's ban on religion, a decline in the appeal of the offi cial ideology, and the populace's inherent psychological needs for security amidst rapid modernization, increasing commercialization and social dislocation. More importantly, religious revival raises questions about the future of religions in China as well as the state's policy towards religion.
Reasons %
1. To seek prosperity and material well-being 51.6
• Escape poverty and seek prosperity 36.0
• Seek material well-being in this life 9.4
• Seek remedy for and escape serious illness 6.2 2. To have spiritual sustenance 29.7
• Disillusioned with and escape from the material world 5.9
• Seek happiness in an afterlife 9.8
• Hope divinity would grant wisdom 7.0
• Hope the soul would be purifi ed 7.0 3. Driven by political and social discontent 20.5
• Dissatisfi ed with corruption, social evil, and social inequality 19.0
• Losing confi dence in the CCP and socialism 1.5
4. To seek knowledge (and fascinated by theologies) 9.8 Indeed, in today's China, modernization and commercialization are no substitute for religion (Luo 2000: 407-17) . In fact, China's economic reform has generated much insecurity and anxiety among its peoples, whereby individuals feel a deep sense of alienation from society and a considerable number of people stoically endure physical suffering because formerly affordable public health-care services have been dismantled. Religion thus provides mental solace and spiritual fulfi lment.
Infl uenced by a religious family Unknown
However, except perhaps for ethnic minorities (especially those in Tibet and Xinjiang), the Han Chinese, at least Buddhists and Daoists who make up the majority of religious believers, have been materialistic and practical in outlook. The Han Chinese will continue to turn to religion primarily hoping for improvement in their mortal lives, and secondarily for their afterlives, but seldom for the administration of the state or to exact revenge on foreign enemies, as do fundamentalists in the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. For Tibetans and Uighurs, however, religion is ingrained in their culture and tradition, and it is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.
Hongyi Harry Lai is Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.
NOTES
with China's opening to the West and the Chinese fascination with the Western culture. 9 Although William Liu (2000: 120) disputes this view, Li did claim himself as a propagator of the true Dharma before the last millennium in his much-publicized Zhuan falun (Li 1994: 33, 11 17 For discussion on the spiritual crisis, refer to Madsen 1998: 8-11 and Wong 1999: 5. 18 For classical studies of revolutions and civil wars in countries experiencing or in the process of modernization, refer to Moore 1966 and Skocpol 1979 . For discussion of effects of modernization on the political structure, refer to Huntington 1968. For sociological discussion on modernization, see Parsons 1959 . For a discussion on social problems and protests in modernization, refer to Eisenstadt 1966.
